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A Bayesian Inference Approach to Unveil Supply
Curves in Electricity Markets
Lesia Mitridati, Pierre Pinson, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—With increased competition in wholesale electricity
markets, the need for new decision-making tools for strategic pro-
ducers has arisen. Optimal bidding strategies have traditionally
been modeled as stochastic profit maximization problems. How-
ever, for producers with non-negligible market power, modeling
the interactions with rival participants is fundamental. This can
be achieved through equilibrium and hierarchical optimization
models. The efficiency of these methods relies on the strategic
producer’s ability to model rival participants’ behavior and
supply curve. But a substantial gap remains in the literature
on modeling this uncertainty. In this study we introduce a
Bayesian inference approach to reveal the aggregate supply curve
in a day-ahead electricity market. The proposed algorithm relies
on Markov Chain Monte Carlo and Sequential Monte Carlo
methods. The major appeal of this approach is that it provides
a complete model of the uncertainty of the aggregate supply
curve, through an estimate of its posterior distribution. We show
on a small case study that we are able to reveal accurately
the aggregate supply curve with no prior information on rival
participants. Finally we show how this piece of information can
be used by a price-maker producer in order to devise an optimal
bidding strategy.
Index Terms—Bayesian inference, Sequential Monte Carlo,
Markov Chain Monte Carlo, Strategic bidding
NOMENCLATURE
Indexes
d Index for days (d = 1, ..., D)
h Index for hours (h = 1, ..., H)
w Index for wind producers (w = 1, ...,W )
g Index for market participants (g = 1, ..., G)
b Index for generation blocks (b = 1, ..., B)
m Index for Markov Chain Monte Carlo iterations
(m = 1, ...,M)
i Index for Sequential Monte Carlo particles (i =
1, ..., N)
Market Clearing Variables and Parameters
λ
spot
d,h Spot price at hour h of day d, in e/MWh
Pg,d,h Power output of market participant g at hour h of
day d, in MWh
Pw,d,h Power output of wind producer w at hour h of
day d, in MWh
L. Mitridati and P. Pinson are with the Technical University of Denmark,
Department of Electrical Engineering, Centre for Electric Power and Energy,
Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark (email: {lemitri,ppin}@dtu.dk)
The authors are partly supported by the Danish Innovation Fund through the
projects 5s - Future Electricity Markets (12-132636/DSF) and CITIES (DSF-
1305-00027B), as well as EUDP through the project EnergyLab Nordhavn
(EUDP 64015-0055).
P g,d,h Offered quantity of market participant g at hour
h of day d, in MWh
Pw,d,h Wind power available from producer w at hour h
of day d, in MWh
Ld,h Electricity load at hour h of day d, in MWh
SFg,d,h Supply function of market participant g at hour h
of day d, in e/MWh
αg,d,h Supply function parameter of market participant
g at hour h of day d, in e/MWh2
βg,d,h Supply function parameter of market participant
g at hour h of day d, in e/MWh
Rg Ramp-up limit of market participant g, in MWh
P g Maximum power output of market participant g,
in MWh
Hidden Markov Model States and Parameters
Λb,d Random vector of latent states of generation block
b in day d
Λd Random vector of latent states of all generation
blocks in day d
Yd Random vector of observable states in day d
Θ Random vector of static model parameters
µb,θ(.) Initial density of the latent states Λb,1:D
fb,θ(.) Transition function of the latent states Λb,1:D
µθ(.) Initial density of the latent states Λ1:D
fθ(.) Transition function of the latent states Λ1:D
Lθ(.) Observations likelihood
pi(.) Prior density of the static parameters Θ
Markov Chain Monte Carlo Algorithm Notations
M0 Number of burn-in iterations
q (.) Proposal density
α (.) Acceptance probability
K (.) Markov chain transition kernel
Sequential Monte Carlo Algorithm Notations
q (.) Importance function
w
(i)
d Normalized importance weight of the particle λ
(i)
d
Aid Ancestral index of the particle λ
(i)
d
pˆ(.) Monte Carlo approximation of target density p(.)
I. INTRODUCTION
THE liberalization of the power sector has led to thedevelopment of wholesale electricity markets. However,
high levels of market concentration and oligopolistic condi-
tions still prevail in various countries [1]. Additionally, due to
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the technical characteristics of the electricity supply industry,
market power is only imperfectly correlated with concentration
measures and can be exercised by small firms during peak
hours [2], [3]. Ref. [4] and [5] present an overview of market
power issues in various countries, and market designs to mit-
igate them. In particular, over the last decade regulators have
focused on monitoring competition behaviors, and increasing
market data transparency [6], [7].
In electricity markets, producers with non-negligible market
power bid a supply function that deviates form their true
marginal cost in order to can increase their profit [8], [9]. The
issue of optimal bidding for strategic producers has tradition-
ally been addressed in the literature as a profit maximization
problem under uncertainty. The authors in [10] modeled the
optimal bidding strategy of a producer on a wholesale market
as a robust optimization problem, introducing uncertainty in
market prices through confidence intervals. And, in [11] the
strategic offering of a wind power producer, for different risk
preferences, is formulated as a two-stage stochastic optimiza-
tion problem. Uncertainty in wind production, day-ahead and
real-time prices is introduced through a finite number of sce-
narios. However, for participants with non-negligible market
power, modeling the uncertainty of rival participants’ behav-
ior is essential. Novel approaches relying on game theory,
agent-based models [12], [13], equilibrium and hierarchical
optimization [14] enable us to design decision-making tools
modeling the interactions between rival participants.
A recently published work introduced a stochastic multi-
layer agent-based model of electricity markets, accounting
for uncertainty of rival participants’ behavior [15]. Ref. [16]
used evolutionary games and near Nash equilibrium to model
competition in electricity markets and predict local marginal
prices. Additionally, the authors in [17] implemented the
agent-based reasoning through a Dynamic Bayesian Network
(DBN) representation and proposed an online Bayesian learn-
ing algorithm to predict loads and Residual Demand Curves
(RDC). As discussed in [18], RDCs are commonly employed
to model and predict the behavior of rival participants. Based
on observed or predicted aggregate demand and supply curves,
each agent builds its individual RDC and optimal bidding
strategy. Finally, the authors in [19]–[22] formulated the
optimal bidding strategy of a price-maker wind producer in the
day-ahead and balancing markets as a stochastic hierarchical
optimization problem. In this model the market clearing is
explicitly formulated as a constraint of the producer’s profit
maximization problem. This approach showed a significant im-
provement in bidding performances, provided that an accurate
description of the aggregate supply curve in the electricity
market is available. Similarly, complementarity theory can
be used to model the optimal dispatch of combined heat
and power plants in sequential heat and electricity markets
[23]. This literature provides useful insight on the strategic
behavior of market participants in oligopolistic markets. The
efficiency of these methods relies on an accurate modeling of
uncertainty sources. The issue of wind production, spot prices
and load forecasting has been extensively addressed in the
literature [24]. However, a gap remains in the description of
the probability density of the aggregate supply curve.
The aforementioned studies suggest that a model for predict-
ing the aggregate supply curve in an electricity market is a key
piece of information for strategic producers to make informed
decisions. Ref. [25] introduced the bid function equilibrium
model, predicting supply curves of participants in an electricity
market based on available data on their marginal costs. The
predictions of this model were validated in a study comparing
the theoretical results to historical bids submitted to the British
spot market [26]. Additionally, the authors in [27] reviewed
two methods for aggregate supply curves prediction based
on principal component analysis and reduced rank regression,
using data on past supply curves. Finally, as discussed in [28]
the RealScen model is an integrated tool that collects and
analysis historic market participants’ bids data, and generates
realistic bids scenarios using artificial neural networks, support
vector models and simple average methods. Combined with
agent-based [12] or complementarity models of electricity
markets, the RealScen provides a powerful decision-making
tool for strategic producers.
However, information on rival participants’ historic bids or
marginal costs is seldom available due to market operators’
confidentiality policies. This type of information is valuable
for both electricity producers to design optimal bidding strate-
gies, and market regulators to monitor competition behaviors
[4]–[7]. To the best of our knowledge, only one paper proposed
a method for inferring these bids based on available market
data [29]. Rival participants’ offering bids on an electricity
market are revealed using an inverse optimization problem.
This approach provides an accurate estimation of the marginal
cost of each participant, provided the dispatched production of
each generation block and all the generators’ technical charac-
teristics are perfectly known. In practice these assumptions are
quite restrictive. Additionally, this approach does not provide
a model of the uncertainty of the offering bids.
That is why we propose a more flexible method, allowing
us to reveal the aggregate supply curve in an electricity market
solely based on historic market data. Bayesian inference
enables us to update our prior belief on the unknown states of
the system, e.g. supply curves, as new information is acquired
through the observed states. Since exact inference methods,
such as the exact expectation-maximization algorithm, are
often computationally intractable (see [30] and [31]), we focus
on approximate stochastic inference methods, such as Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) [32]–[35] and Sequential Monte
Carlo (SMC) [36]–[40] algorithms. The aim of stochastic
inference algorithms is to iteratively build a large sample,
approximately distributed according to the distribution of in-
terest. These methods provide a description of the uncertainty
of the unknown states, through an estimate of their posterior
distribution, from which it is easy to sample. That is why
they have found applications in various research fields, such
as finance [41], multi-target tracking [42] and meteorology
[43], [44].
In view of the state-of-the-art described above, the contri-
butions of this paper are threefold:
• We model electricity market mechanisms using a Hidden
Markov Model (HMM). The net aggregate supply curve
is modeled as the hidden states of the system, and spot
0885-8950 (c) 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TPWRS.2017.2757980, IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems
3
prices and total electricity traded as the observed states
[30], [45], [46]. The hidden states and observations are
modeled as random variables and the HMM provides a
graphical representation of the conditional dependences
between these variables. This model provides a natural
framework for a Bayesian inference approach.
• We present a novel algorithm to approximate the posterior
distribution of the aggregate supply curve in a day-
ahead electricity market, conditionally on observations
on spot prices and total electricity traded. The proposed
algorithm relies on classical MCMC and SMC algorithms
developed in the literature [47]. Our main contribution is
to introduce a simulation-based SMC approximation of
the traditional Gibbs sampler algorithm.
• We show the accuracy of the proposed algorithm on a
modified version of the IEEE 24-bus system. As informa-
tion on real supply curves is not available, we randomly
generate offering bids and clear the day-ahead market
over the thirty-day simulation period. The market out-
comes are used as inputs for the inference problem. This
way we can test the proposed algorithm in a controlled
environment and compare the outputs to the simulated
supply curves.
The structure of this paper is the following. Section II
introduces the problem and its formulation as a Bayesian
inference problem. The proposed Bayesian inference algorithm
is detailed in Section III. In Section IV we implement the
proposed algorithm on a modified version of the IEEE 24-bus
system and discuss the results. Finally, Section V concludes
the paper and gathers perspectives regarding future works.
II. INFERENCE PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we introduce a novel HMM formulation of a
market clearing mechanism and we formulate mathematically
the supply curve inference problem. The proposed inference
algorithm and its implementation are further detailed in Sec-
tions III and IV.
A. Electricity Market Clearing Mechanism
We consider a strategic producer participating in a day-
ahead electricity market. We propose a market clearing model
similar to European electricity markets. Participants submit
their offers to the market operator for each hour of the
following day. They can place two types of offers: single
hourly or block orders, linking different hours of the day.
As a large majority of the energy is traded through single
hourly orders we neglect block orders [48]. For single hourly
orders, each participant bids a combination of prices and
quantities, represented by its supply function SFg,d,h (Pg,d,h).
In oligopolistic markets, strategic producers can increase their
profit by bidding a supply function that deviates form their true
marginal cost. We adopt a Linear Supply Function Equilibrium
(LSFE) model [49], such that
SFg,d,h (Pg,d,h) = αg,d,hPg,d,h + βg,d,h. (1)
Wind producers are assumed to offer their production at zero
marginal cost. Finally, producers can exercise their strategic
behavior by curtailing some of their production, i.e. by altering
their offered quantity P g,d,h.
Since in practice the competition on the demand side is
fairly limited, we assume a completely inelastic demand. It is
important to note that this market modeling assumption does
not result in any loss of generality in the proposed inference
algorithm. Indeed, we are only interested in inferring the
aggregate supply curve based on observations on spot prices
and total electricity traded. These observations can be thought
of as the intersection points between the demand and supply
curves. Hence, assumptions on the shape of the demand curve
do not influence the inference algorithm.
Finally, we neglect transmission constraints, ramping limits
and unit commitment variables because we focus on a Euro-
pean market. As a result, the market clearing for a specific
day d can be formulated as
min.
Ωd
∑
g,h
(αg,d,hPg,d,h + βg,d,h)Pg,d,h (2a)
s.t.
∑
g
Pg,d,h +
∑
w
Pw,d,h = Ld,h ∀h : λ
spot
d,h (2b)
0 ≤ Pg,d,h ≤ P g,d,h ∀g, h (2c)
0 ≤ Pw,d,h ≤ Pw,d,h ∀w, h (2d)
where Ωd = {Pg,d,h, Pw,d,h : ∀g, w, h}. The objective of this
convex optimization problem is to minimize the production
cost in (2a), subject to power balance equations (2b), and
power output limits (2c)-(2d). As a result, the spot prices λspotd,h
are the dual variables of the power balance equations.
B. Bayesian Inference Framework
The supply functions of individual participants in the day-
ahead electricity market and the resulting aggregate supply
curve are not usually disclosed by the market operator. Our
aim is to reveal the historic aggregate supply curve, based on
publicly available information. In practice market data may
vary depending on the transparency policies of specific market
operators. For instance, in [29] it is assumed that spot prices
and dispatched production of each market participant can be
observed. However, this assumption limits the applicability of
the proposed method. That is why we consider that only spot
prices and total electricity traded are disclosed. The market
clearing mechanism described in Section II-A can be modeled
as a factorial HMM. In this approach the parameters of the
net aggregate supply curve, such as price parameters αg,d,h
and βg,d,h or offered production P g,d,h, can be modeled as
the hidden states of the system, and the spot prices and total
electricity traded as the observed states [30], [45], [46].
We can distinguish two applications. In the most general
case, no information is available on individual market partic-
ipants. We can then adopt a LSFE model for the aggregate
supply curve, such that
SFb,d,h (Pb,d,h) = αb,d,hPb,d,h + βb,d,h ∀b. (3)
Note that the generation blocks b are of arbitrary size (e.g.
10 MW) and do not necessarily represent individual market
participants. As a result, we can model the price parame-
ters of the aggregate supply function, αb,d,h and βb,d,h, as
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hidden variables. Furthermore, if more information on the
technical characteristics of market participants is available,
such as maximum power output and ramping limits, we can
model the price parameters of the individual supply function
SFg,d,h (Pg,d,h) and the offered production P g,d,h as hidden
variables. However, this is not included in the scope of our
study.
We consider for now that no information on individual
generators is available. Fig. 1 shows the structure of the
proposed HMM. Each generation block b fixes its price
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Fig. 1. HMM structure of the market clearing mechanism
parameters vector λb,d = [αb,d,h, βb,d,h : h = 1, ..., 24] for a
specific day d. The hidden variables λb,d are modeled as
random vectors, denoted Λb,d. Each generation block b updates
its offer from one day to the following, using a so-called
introspection process. It is not required for us to know the
nature of this introspection process. We model the stochastic
process Λb,1:D = {Λb,d : d = 1, ..., D} as a first-order Markov
process. Our prior knowledge of the latent states and the
introspection process is summarized by the initial density
µb,θ (λb,1) = P (Λb,1 = λb,1 | Θ = θ) , (4)
and transition function
fb,θ (λb,d+1 | λb,d)
= P (Λb,d+1 = λb,d+1 | Λb,d = λb,d,Θ = θ) .
(5)
The transition function and initial density also depend on a set
of static model parameters. These parameters are also assumed
unknown and modeled as a random vector Θ. The prior density
pi(θ) = P (Θ = θ) represents our prior knowledge of these
parameters.
As we are interested in inferring the aggregate supply
curve rather than the individual supply curves of rival par-
ticipants, we consider directly the collated random vectors
Λd = [Λb,d : b = 1, ..., B] and the stochastic process Λ1:D =
{Λd : d = 1, ..., D}, taking values in Φ ⊆ R2HBD , modeling
the aggregate latent states of all generation blocks. As partic-
ipants cannot observe the bids of their rivals, the stochastic
processes Λb,1:D are assumed mutually independent. As a
result, the stochastic process Λ1:D is a Markov process and our
prior knowledge of the aggregate latent states is summarized
by the initial density and transition function

µθ (λ1) =
∏
b
µb,θ (λb,1) ,
fθ (λd+1 | λd) =
∏
b
fb,θ (λb,d+1 | λb,d) .
(6)
The realizations of the stochastic process Λ1:D can not be
observed directly, however we can refine our prior knowledge
through observations of the spot prices and electricity loads,
denoted for simplicity yd =
[
λ
spot
d,h , Ld,h : h = 1, ..., 24
]
. In
HMMs these observed states are also modeled as random vec-
tors Yd and assumed conditionally independent given the latent
states. Hence, the observations’ likelihood can be expressed as
Lθ (yd | λd)
= P (Yd = yd | Λ1:D = λ1:D, Y1:d−1 = y1:d−1,Θ = θ)
= P (Yd = yd | Λd = λd,Θ = θ) .
(7)
Our aim is to infer the posterior density of the latent states
and parameters conditionally on the observations over the
selected period d = 1, ..., D,
p (λ1:D, θ | y1:D) = P (Λ1:D = λ1:D,Θ = θ | Y1:D = y1:D) .
(8)
III. BAYESIAN INFERENCE ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a novel states and parameters
inference algorithm, targeting the posterior density of the
aggregate supply curve by iterative sampling. We first present
in Section III-A a general Gibbs sampler algorithm. We then
introduce in Section III-B a novel simulation-based SMC
approximation of the tradition Gibbs sampler and detail the
proposed algorithm in Section III-C. The implementation of
thi algorithm is further detailed in Section IV-B.
A. Gibbs Sampler
As the target density p (λ1:D, θ | y1:D) is unknown, it is
not possible to sample directly from it. But Bayes’ formula
provides an expression of the posterior density in function
of the observations’ likelihood and prior density, up to a
normalizing constant,
p (λ1:D, θ | y1:D)
∝ pi (θ)µθ (λ1)
D∏
d=1
Lθ (yd | λd) fθ (λd+1 | λd) ,
(9)
where ∝ represents the proportionality operator. In that case,
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods allow us to
approximate this target density by generating a correlated
sequence of samples
{
λ
(m)
1:D , θ
(m) : m = 1, ...,M
}
using a
Markov process [32]–[34]. That is, at each iteration (m+ 1)
the updated values are drawn from a Markov transition kernel
K
(
λ
(m+1)
1:D , θ
(m+1) | λ
(m)
1:D , θ
(m)
)
, from which it is easy to
sample. If this transition kernel satisfies the detailed balance
condition, the Markov chain will admit the target density as
stationary distribution [34]. Hence, after a transient phase,
the realized states
{
λ
(m)
1:D , θ
(m) : m =M0, ...,M
}
will mimic
samples drawn from the target density.
MCMC methods mainly rely on the Metropolis-Hastings
(MH) algorithm [50]. At iteration (m+ 1) the MH update
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involves drawing a candidate value from a proposal den-
sity q
(
λ∗1:D, θ
∗ | λ
(m)
1:D , θ
(m)
)
. The candidate is accepted with
probability
α
(
λ∗1:D, θ
∗ | λ
(m)
1:D , θ
(m)
)
= min

1, p (λ∗1:D, θ∗ | y1:D) q
(
λ
(m)
1:D , θ
(m) | λ∗1:D, θ
∗
)
p
(
λ
(m)
1:D , θ
(m) | y1:D
)
q
(
λ∗1:D, θ
∗ | λ
(m)
1:D , θ
(m)
)

 ,
(10)
otherwise the Markov chain remains at λ(m+1)1:D = λ
(m)
1:D and
θ(m+1) = θ(m). Although the target density is unknown,
based on Bayes’ formula (9) we can express it up to a
normalizing constant and compute the acceptance ratio in (10).
By construction the transition kernel of this Markov chain
satisfies the detailed balance equation and the MH algorithm
admits p (λ1:D, θ | y1:D) as stationary distribution. As a result,
under weak assumptions on the proposal density, asymptotic
convergence is guaranteed [34].
However, in high-dimensional problems such as this one,
designing an efficient proposal density function is a difficult
task. For that reason, we implement the Gibbs sampler al-
gorithm. It is a special case of the MH algorithm, for which
the parameters and latent states are updated alternatively using
their posterior densities as proposal densities [51], such that
θ(m) ∼ p
(
. | λ
(m−1)
1:D , y1:D
)
, (11a)
λ
(m)
1:D ∼ p
(
. | y1:D, θ
(m)
)
. (11b)
It results from (10) that the acceptance probability in the Gibbs
sampler is always equal to one.
The Gibbs sampler is a O(dΦ) algorithm, which can become
computationally challenging when the dimension of the prob-
lem (dΦ = 2BDH) grows [35]. Finally, in most cases it is
easy to sample directly from p
(
θ | λ
(m−1)
1:D , y1:D
)
. Assuming
that we can sample from p
(
λ1:D | y1:D, θ
(m)
)
, the Gibbs
sampler algorithm builds iteratively a sequence of samples{
λ
(m)
1:D , θ
(m) : m =M0, ...,M
}
approximately distributed ac-
cording to the target density.
B. Sequential Monte Carlo Approximation
For a given value θ(m) of the parameters it is gen-
erally not possible to sample directly from the posterior
density p
(
λ1:D | y1:D, θ(m)
)
. The authors in [47] suggest
approximating it using a Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC)
algorithm. The general idea behind SMC algorithms is to
build iteratively a large cloud of equally-weighted particles{
λ
(i)
1:D : i = 1, ..., N
}
approximately distributed according to
the posterior density p
(
λ1:D | y1:D, θ(m)
) [37]–[40].
For that, we divide the task by sequentially approximating
the densities p
(
λ1:d | y1:d, θ(m)
)
for d = 1, ..., D. At each
step d, we consider the cloud of equally-weighted particles
{
λ
(i)
1:d : i = 1, ..., N
}
approximately distributed according to
the density of interest p
(
λ1:d | y1:d, θ(m)
)
. The factorization
p
(
λ1:d+1 | y1:d+1, θ
(m)
)
∝ p
(
λ1:d | y1:d, θ
(m)
)
fθ(m) (λd+1 | λd)Lθ(m) (yd+1 | λd+1)
(12)
suggests propagating each particle λ(i)1:d to the following day
using an importance sampling-resampling mechanism. N off-
spring particles λ˜(i)d+1 are sampled from a so-called impor-
tance function q
(
λ˜
(i)
d+1 | λ
(i)
d , yd+1, θ
(m)
)
, and then resampled
based on their relative importance weights,
w
(i)
d+1 ∝
p
(
λ
(i)
1:d, λ˜
(i)
d+1, y1:d+1 | θ
(m)
)
p
(
λ
(i)
1:d, y1:d | θ
(m)
)
q
(
λ˜
(i)
d+1 | λ
(i)
d , yd+1, θ
(m)
)
∝
fθ(m)
(
λ˜
(i)
d+1 | λ
(i)
d
)
Lθ(m)
(
yd+1 | λ˜
(i)
d+1
)
q
(
λ˜
(i)
d+1 | λ
(i)
d , yd+1, θ
(m)
) .
(13)
At the resampling step, N particles λ(i)d+1 are drawn from
the weighted sample
{
λ˜
(i)
d+1 : i = 1, ..., N
}
. The resampling
mechanism implemented in this study is further detailed in
Appendix A. The resampling step is a bottleneck of the SMC
algorithm but the authors in [52] proposed an efficient stratified
resampling algorithm that takes O (N).
The resampled cloud of N equally-weighted parti-
cles
{
λ
(i)
1:d+1 : i = 1, ..., N
}
is now considered approxi-
mately distributed according to the probability density
p
(
λ1:d+1 | y1:d+1, θ
(m)
)
and propagated to the following step.
The appeal of this approach is that it provides an estimator of
the posterior density from which it is easy to sample,
pˆ
(
λ1:D | y1:D, θ
(m)
)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ
(
λ
(i)
1:D − λ1:D
)
, (14)
where δ(.) represents the Dirac delta function.
However, Ref. [47] showed that an approximate Gibbs
sampler, updating the states λ(m+1)1:D by sampling from this
Monte Carlo estimator does not admit the target density
p (λ1:D, θ | y1:D) as stationary distribution. Instead, it is nec-
essary to use a conditional SMC algorithm to approximate
the posterior density p
(
λ1:D | y1:D, θ(m)
)
at each iteration
m ≥ 1. The particles
{
λ
(i)
1:D : i = 1, ..., N
}
are generated
conditionally on the reference trajectory λ(m−1)1:D , associated
with the ancestral lineage Am−11:D . The conditioning on the
reference trajectory is implemented by ensuring that this path
survives all the sampling and resampling steps and generating
the remaining N − 1 particles the usual way. Informally, the
introduction of a reference trajectory can be thought of as
guiding the sampled particles to a relevant region of the space.
In practice, it ensures that the transition kernel leaves the target
distribution invariant for any number of particles N ≥ 2 [53].
Additionally, the importance function has a great influence
on the accuracy of SMC algorithms. It is usually recommended
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to set the posterior density p
(
λd+1 | λd, yd+1, θ(m)
)
as impor-
tance function [47]. As it is not possible to sample directly
from the posterior density, we use the transition function
of the latent Markov chain fθ(m)
(
λ˜d+1 | λd
)
as importance
function. As a result, the importance weights defined in (13)
only depend on the observations’ likelihood
w
(i)
d+1 ∝ Lθ(m)
(
yd+1 | λ˜
(i)
d+1
)
. (15)
This method relies on the assumption that the observations’
likelihood Lθ(m) is known and can be computed pointwise. In
our model Lθ(m) is difficult to express analytically due to the
complex HMM structure. And designing a very uninformative
likelihood function would reduce the efficiency of the resam-
pling step in the SMC algorithm. Another solution, inspired by
[43], [44], is to simulate for each particle λ˜(i)d+1 a theoretical
market outcome y(i)d+1 =
[
λ
spot(i)
d+1,h , L
(i)
d+1,h : ∀w, g, h
]
using
the market clearing model in Section II-A. This way, we can
define the observations’ likelihood and importance weights
in function of the simulated markets outcomes. Additionally,
since power balance L(i)d+1,h = Ld+1,h is enforced for each
particle, we can express the importance weights only in
function of the observed and simulated spot prices without
loss of generality, such that
w
(i)
d+1 ∝ Lθ(m)
(
λ
spot
d+1 | λ
spot(i)
d+1
)
. (16)
The conditional SMC algorithm described above is detailed in
Algorithm 1.
C. Particle Gibbs Sampler
Based on the Gibbs sampler and the conditional SMC
algorithm described above, we propose a so-called Particle
Gibbs Sampler (PGS) targeting the joint posterior density
p (λ1:D, θ | y1:D). At each iteration m ≥ 1, the parameters are
updated using their posterior density p
(
θ(m) | λ
(m−1)
1:D , y1:D
)
as importance function. A conditional SMC algorithm
(Algorithm 1) is run to generate a cloud of particles{
λ
(i)
1:D : i = 1, ...N
}
approximately distributed according to
the posterior density p
(
λ1:D | y1:D, θ(m)
)
. The latent states
are updated by sampling from the Monte Carlo estimator
defined in (14). In practice this is realized by sampling an
index i0 from the discrete uniform distribution U{1, N} and
setting the states λ(m)1:D = λ
(i0)
1:D , associated with the ancestral
lineage Am1:D = A
i0
1:D . The PGS described above is detailed
in Algorithm 2.
IV. CASE STUDY: INFERRING THE AGGREGATE SUPPLY
CURVE
Data on rival participants’ real supply functions is not avail-
able. As a result we build the case study by simulating rival
participants bids and day-ahead market clearing over thirty
days. That way, we can apply the proposed inference method
in a controlled environment and assess its performance. Based
on the observations on spot prices and total electricity traded,
we try to infer the aggregate supply curve of this system. We
then compare the outputs of the inference algorithm to the
assumed data.
Algorithm 1 Conditional SMC algorithm at iteration m ≥ 1
Let λ(m−1)1:D be the reference path, associated with the
ancestral lineage Am−11:D
for d = 1 do
For i 6= Am−11 , sample the N − 1 particles λ˜
(i)
1 ∼
µθ(m) (.)
For i = Am−11 , set the particle λ˜
(i)
1 = λ
(m−1)
1
Simulate a market clearing for each particle λ˜(i)1 and
compute the theoretical market outcomes y(i)1
Compute the importance weights w(i)1 for all particles
For i 6= Am−11 , resample the N − 1 particles λ
(i)
1 and
their ancestral indexes Ai1 from the weighted sample{
λ˜
(i)
1 : i = 1, ..., N
}
For i = Am−11 , set the resampled particle λ
(i)
1 = λ
(m−1)
1
and Ai1 = Am−11
end for
for d = 2, ..., D do
For i 6= Am−1d , sample the N − 1 particles λ˜
(i)
d ∼
fθ(m)
(
. | λ
(i)
d−1
)
For i = Am−1d , set the particle λ˜
(i)
d = λ
(m−1)
d
Simulate a market clearing for each particle λ˜(i)d and
compute the theoretical market outcomes y(i)d
Compute the importance weights w(i)d for all particles
For i 6= Am−1d , resample the N − 1 particles λ
(i)
d and
their ancestral indexes Aid from the weighted sample{
λ˜
(i)
d : i = d, ..., N
}
For i = Am−1d , set the resampled particle λ
(Bd)
d =
λ
(m−1)
d and Aid = A
m−1
d
Set λ(i)1:d =
{
λ
(Aid)
1:d−1, λ
(i)
d
}
and Ai1:d =
{
A
Aid
1:d−1, A
i
d
}
end for
Algorithm 2 Particle Gibbs Sampler
Set arbitrary the initial parameters θ(0), states λ(0)1:D and
ancestral lineage A01:D
for m = 1, ...,M do
Sample the updated value of the parameters θ from their
posterior density: θ(m) ∼ p
(
. | λ
(m−1)
1:D , y1:D
)
Run a conditional SMC algorithm targeting the posterior
density p
(
λ1:D | y1:D, θ(m)
)
, conditionally on the refer-
ence path λ(m−1)1:D associated with the ancestral lineage
Am−11:D (Algorithm 1)
Sample the updated value of the latent states from the
Monte Carlo approximation: λ(m)1:D ∼ pˆ
(
. | y1:D, θ(m)
)
(the ancestral lineage Am1:D is also implicitly sampled)
end for
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A. Case Study Setup
We consider a modified version of the IEEE 24-bus system
as presented in [54], with twelve thermal generators, and six
wind farms of 200 MW each. The technical characteristics of
the participants are collated in Table I in Appendix B. We gen-
erate randomly the supply curves of each market participant
by sampling for each hour of the thirty-day simulation period
from the normal distributions

αg,d,h ∼ N
(
µα0g , σ
2
α0g
)
∀d, h,
βg,d,h ∼ N
(
µβ0g , σ
2
β0g
)
∀d, h.
(17)
The mean values and standard deviations of these Normal
distributions are collated in Table I in Appendix B. Fig. 2
shows the simulated price parameters for each participant, as
well as the median, upper and lower quartiles. In addition, we
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Fig. 2. Case Study Setup: Price parameters bids over the simulation period
(30 days)
consider that market participants are not strategic in quantities,
and offer their maximum available production, such that
P g,d,h+1 = min
{
P g,d,h +Rg, P g
}
∀d, h. (18)
Fig. 3 shows the resulting aggregate supply curves for each
hour of the simulation period.
We use the load profile data provided in [54] and introduce
load factors for three representative days: base day, shoulder
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Fig. 3. [Simulated hourly aggregate supply curves and average supply curve
over the simulation period (30 days)
day and peak day and generate randomly the load profiles
for thirty days. As we assumed a European market framework
without transmission constraints, we can aggregate the loads at
each bus. In addition, we use historic wind production factors
from Nord Pool. Finally, using this data we simulate a market
clearing over thirty days. Fig. 4 shows the load profiles, total
wind production, and spot prices over the simulation period.
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(a) Hourly electricity load for 3 representative days
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(b) Total hourly wind production over the simulation period (30 days)
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(c) Spot prices over the simulation period (30 days)
Fig. 4. Case Study Setup: Market clearing simulation results
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B. Implementation of the PGS Algorithm
We now assume that spot prices and total electricity traded
on the market for each hour of the simulation period are
directly available from market data. In addition, wind pro-
duction over the simulation period can easily be estimated
using historical meteorological data. Our goal is to estimate the
posterior distribution of the aggregate supply curve, divided
into B = 10 generation blocks of 210 MW each.
Our prior knowledge on the latent states αb,1:D and βb,1:D
is characterized by their prior densities. There is no systematic
approach in the literature to select prior densities. When
no information is available, it is recommended to set an
uninformative prior density that covers the whole range of
possible values. For each generation block b, we model the
initial density and transition function of the Markov chain
αb,1:D as independent Normal distributions{
αb,1 | µαb , σαb ∼ N (Mαb ,Σαb) ,
αb,d+1 | αb,d, σαb ∼ N (αb,d,Σαb) ∀d,
(19)
where Σαb = σ2αbI24 is the covariance matrix and Mαb =
[µαb : h = 1, ..., 24] the mean vector. In addition, the static
parameters µαb and hαb = 1σ2αb
are also considered unknown.
A standard scheme in the literature is to use an independent
Normal-Gamma prior to describe them, such that{
µαb ∼ N (mαb , Vαb) ,
hαb ∼ Γ (aαb , bαb) ,
(20)
where aαb is the shape parameter and bαb the inverse scale
parameter. By analogy, we define Normal initial densities and
transition functions for the latent states βb,1:D, and Normal-
Gamma prior densities for the static model parameters µβb
and hβb .
We select the hyperparameters of the prior densities
mβ = [10.0, 11.7, 13.3, 15.0, 16.7, 18.3, 20.0, 21.7, 23.3, 25.0] ,
mαb = 0.001, Vαb = 0.001, Vβb = 100, aβb = bβb = 10
−4
,
aαb = 0.1 and bαb = 5 for all the generation blocks. Fig. 5
shows the initial guess on the average aggregate supply curve,
such that SFb (Pb) = mαbP 2b +mβbPb.
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Fig. 5. Initial guess on the average supply curve: SFb (Pb) = mαbP 2b +
mβbPb
As explained in Section III-B, the observations’ likelihood
is defined in function of the simulated spot prices λˆspot(i)d . For
simplicity we assume a Normal distribution
λ
spot
d | λ
spot(i)
d ,Σ
spot ∼ N
(
λ
spot(i)
d ,Σ
spot
)
(21)
where Σspot = σspot2I24 is the covariance matrix. We set
arbitrary σspot = 2.
At each Gibbs iteration m, we update the static parameters’
posterior densities based on the expression of the observations’
likelihood and prior densities, such that{
µ
(m)
αb | y1:D, h
(m−1)
αb ∼ N
(
m¯αb , V¯αb
)
h
(m)
αb | y1:D, µ
(m)
αb ∼ Γ
(
a¯αb , b¯αb
) (22)
where

1
V¯αb
= 1
Vαb
+ h
(m−1)
αb ,
m¯αb = V¯αb
(
mαb
Vαb
+ h
(m−1)
αb α
(m−1)
b,1
)
,
a¯αb = aαb +
D
2 ,
b¯αb = bαb +
(
α
(m−1)
b,1 −µ
(m)
αb
)2
+
∑T
t=2
(
α
(m−1)
b,t
−α
(m−1)
b,t−1
)2
2 .
(23)
As suggested in the literature, an adequate number of
particles for the SMC algorithm is N = 2000. Although
MH and Gibbs sampler algorithms are guarantied to con-
verge asymptotically, at a given iteration m there is no clear
indication on whether they have converged. Providing tight
bounds for the convergence rate of these algorithms can be
challenging but the authors in [55]–[57] showed that under
mild assumptions the convergence rate is polynomial in the
dimension of the problem. Additionally, various diagnostic
tools can be applied to the outputs of the algorithm to assess its
convergence [58], [59]. As we implement the proposed PGS
algorithm in a controlled environment, we empirically choose
M = 200 iterations to achieve convergence.
C. Results
We implemented this algorithm in Python 3.5, using Gurobi
7.0.2 solver, on a Processor Intel Core i5-6200U CPU @ 2.30
GHz (8.00 GB RAM). The CPU time for each SMC iteration
is 9.15 seconds. The total execution time of the algorithm
depends on the mixing rate of the Markov chain.
After a transient phase (M0 = 100) the correlated sequence{
λ
(m)
1:D , θ
(m) : m =M0, ...,M
}
is considered approximately
distributed according to the target density p (λ1:D, θ | y1:D).
Fig. 6 shows the MCMC states of the static parameters µ(m)αg
and µ(m)βg for m = M0, ...,M . Additionally, the estimated
values of the static price parameters are collated in Table II
in Appendix B. These values can not directly be compared
to the true price parameters of the participants. But, Fig. 7
shows the resulting estimated aggregate supply curve and the
2σ confidence interval, based on the estimated static price
parameters. This shows that the proposed algorithm is able
to approximate the aggregate supply curve with no prior
information on rival participants. However, few observations
are available for net loads lower than 420 MWh and higher
than 1850 MWh, i.e. the market participants in this region
of the aggregate supply curve are rarely marginal. As a
result, these regions of the aggregtae supply curve can not
be estimated accurately.
As previously discussed, the proposed algorithm provides
accurate information on the historic aggregate supply curve,
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Fig. 6. MCMC states of the static parameters (median, upper and lower
quartiles)
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Fig. 7. Case study 1: Estimated aggregate supply curve and 2σ confidence
interval
which is a valuable input for supply function prediction tools
relying on multi-agent-based models and neural networks
[12], [17], [27]. Additionally, the accuracy of hierarchical
optimization approaches presented in [19]–[21], [23], relies
on the ability to generate accurate scenarios of the aggregate
supply curve. As a result, the description of the uncertainty
through its posterior density, is a key piece of information for
strategic producers.
V. CONCLUSION
The Particle Gibbs Sampler algorithm proposed in this paper
provides a complete model of the uncertainty of the aggregate
supply curve, through an estimate of its posterior probability
density. We showed on a modified version of the IEEE 24-bus
system that this method allows us to accurately approximate
the aggregate supply curve with no prior information on rival
participants. These results provide valuable inputs for supply
function prediction tools, and decision-making problems under
uncertainty. Additionally, for regulators this approach can be
useful to monitor market power and competition behaviors in
electricity markets.
This work opens up various opportunities for future re-
search. First, the model proposed in this paper can be gen-
eralized to accommodate different market frameworks by
adapting the market clearing mechanism in Section II. In
particular, it is possible to study unit commitment problems by
including network and operational constraints. In that setting,
the technical characteristics of the generators, can be treated
as unknown static parameters and their posterior density can
be estimated as well. Additionally, this study focuses on
inferring the aggregate supply curve. A natural extension to
this work is to estimate the individual supply curves of rival
participants. Competition in quantity can be introduced by
modeling quantities offered to the market as latent states.
Furthermore, as previously discussed, the computational
complexity and convergence rates is a major limitation for im-
plementing SMC and MCMC algorithms to high-dimensional
inference problems. Ref. [32] presents various methods for
improving the convergence rate of MH and Gibbs sampler
algorithms. Additionally, certain steps of the algorithm, such
as sampling and resampling, can easily be parallelized. Al-
ternative inference methods could also be investigated to
address this issue. It is sometime suggested that combining
deterministic and stochastic inference techniques, also called
Rao-Blackwellisation, can improve greatly the computational
time of MCMC algorithms [60]. Similarly, methods combining
variational approximation and MCMC could allow improving
convergence speed of standard MCMC algorithms [61]. Fi-
nally, the method proposed in this paper can be generalized
by investigating nonparametric Bayesian inference methods,
allowing us to reduce the number of assumptions on the
underlying states and parameters [62].
APPENDIX A: STRATIFIED RESAMPLING ALGORITHM
In order to mitigate the variance introduced by standard
multinomial resampling, we implement a stratified resampling
mechanism [63]. We sample N independent random variables
from the uniform distributions
u(i) ∼ U
(
i− 1
N
,
i
N
]
for i = 1, ..., N. (24)
We then define the ancestral indexes Aid+1 = j and the
resampled particles λ(i)d+1 = λ˜
(j)
d+1, such that
j−1∑
k=1
w
(k)
d+1 < u
(i) ≤
j∑
k=1
w
(k)
d+1. (25)
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As a result, this resampling mechanism allows the particles
with the lowest importance weights to be resampled at most
once.
APPENDIX B: CASE STUDY DETAILED PARAMETERS AND
RESULTS
TABLE I
CASE STUDY SETUP: GENERATION UNITS PARAMETERS
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6
P g 100 100 200 200 300 300
Rg 20 20 60 80 80 180
µβ0g
4.5 5.5 7.6 8.5 9.2 10.9
σβ0g
0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7
µα0g
0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
σα0g
0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.001 0.001
g7 g8 g9 g10 g11 g12
P g 200 200 250 250 100 100
Rg 20 20 60 80 80 180
µβ0g
13.3 15.1 17.1 20.7 22.5 26.1
σβ0g
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 2.0
µα0g
0.007 0.007 0.01 0.01 0.015 0.02
σα0g
0.001 0.001 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.002
TABLE II
CASE STUDY: ESTIMATED POSTERIOR DENSITY OF THE AGGREGATE
SUPPLY CURVE
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
µˆβb 6.35 10.33 8.43 8.93 9.92
σˆβb 4.02 1.92 2.41 1.41 2.64
µˆαb 0.01438 0.00246 0.00440 0.00660 0.01067
σˆαg 0.00154 0.00035 0.00088 0.00089 0.00138
b6 b7 b8 b9 b10
µˆβb 13.19 16.01 19.79 22.20 29.05
σˆβb 3.78 2.72 3.15 3.17 3.90
µˆαb 0.00865 0.01077 0.00517 0.00792 0.01040
σˆαb 0.00095 0.00197 0.00071 0.00100 0.00116
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